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"There seems, with some, Sir, to be a hope, that, from some cause or other; from some combination of passions and events, such as no philosophy can explain, and no history furnish an example of, that Buonaparté, instead of proceeding to new conquests, will be willing to sit down contented with those which he has already. Sir, the great objection of this hope, to say nothing of its baseness, is its utter extravagance. On what possible ground do we believe this? Is it in the general nature of ambition? Is it in the nature of French ambition? Does it happen commonly to those, whether nations, or individuals, who are seized with the spirit of aggrandizement and acquisition, that they are inclined rather to count what they possess, than to look forward to what yet remains to be acquired? When there is but one country that remains between France and the empire of the world, just then is the moment when we choose to suppose, that her ambition will stop of its own accord! It is impossible not to see, in these feeble and sickly imaginations, that fatal temper of mind, which leads men to look for help and comfort from any source rather than from their own exertions."—MR. WINDHAM'S Speech, in the House of Commons, 4th Nov. 1801.

961]

[962

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE.—The Papers relative to this negotiation are before the public, and they will, of course, be duly recorded in the Register.—The worst possible tendency that the publication of these papers can have, is, to *amuse* us, and, accordingly, that is, I dare say, the tendency, which the French intended they should have.—When we take a view of the real state of things at the times when the several papers were written; when we consider, that the only object France had in view was to complete her conquest of Europe, while the hopes of the other powers, England *not* excepted, extended no further than to obtain permission to live in peace without being absolutely subjugated; when, with such a view of the relative state of the negotiating parties, we read the Papers now before us, who is not astonished, that the Prince of Benevento could have had the face to talk of the *ambitious* and *domineering* projects of Russia and England, and that he could seriously have argued upon such an idea? Seeing, as he did, the peace-seekers before him; seeing the Continent almost wholly subdued; seeing so many kings and princes dethroned; seeing one Buonaparté king of Holland, another king of Naples, seeing the rest of Italy united to France, seeing Spain under the absolute controul of a French envoy; in short, seeing *himself a prince*, how could Talleyrand have the face to talk, as it were in good earnest, of the necessity of terms calculated to insure the safety of France; calculated, Good God! to prevent France from being conquered by England; or, at least, to prevent England from being the dictator of Europe! Yet, one cannot very well blame him. The peace-seeking envoys still spoke in the name of their high

and mighty sovereigns; they still talked of the inexhaustible resources of their several states; they "made believe," as the children say, that they were not afraid; they assumed an air of unconcern from the same sort of motive that the plough-boy whistles or sings through the church-yard at midnight; and, therefore, Talleyrand appears to have fixed upon the above-mentioned mode of treating them; as if, perceiving the object of their big talk, he had said: "I know very well you are the envoys of great and mighty and valiant nations, who are not at all oppressed by taxes, and who are well able to carry on the war for any length of time; all this I know, and, therefore, I am for making such terms with you, and for treating with you in such a manner, as shall be likely to tend towards preventing you from domineering over us."—The object of France being to complete the subjugation of Europe, England inclusive, it is quite natural that she should not openly avow that object, but that she should disguise, as much as possible, her real intentions; and, though it is scarcely credible; though, in no former time, it would have been looked upon as possible; yet, the fact is, that papers such as Talleyrand has written relative to the late overtures for peace, and which papers are now published, have actually served, and do still serve, to disguise this great ultimate object, in this country, at least, where, more than in all the world besides, he must be desirous to see his papers answer their intended purpose. This success of his endeavours, however, arises more from our want of will than our want of capacity to discover the truth. Men are never very quick in descrying that which they wish not to see; they are never very ready to lend an ear to that which they wish not to believe.

That we do not wish to see our country conquered Talleyrand knows; and, he knows, too, that we shall be very well contented without having to fight any battles, especially by land, to prevent so dreadful a termination of the contest; and hence he, who, though a prince, is a great political philosopher, concludes, that we shall be ready to give ear to any thing, the tendency of which is to comfort us with the notion that we have nothing to apprehend from the future projects of France. For this reason it is, that he amuses us with arguments about the rights of France and of neutrals upon the seas; with observations calculated to flatter the empty vanity of those amongst us, who set no value upon a predominance in any thing but trade and commercial riches, which he well knows to be the most numerous class in the parliament as well as out of it; with affected complaints of *our* encroachments; and with representations and distinctions calculated to excite a contest for the favour of Napoleon amongst those, whose only object of rivalry ought to be, that of being worthy of the greatest portion of his dread. In short, the use and the end of papers, such as have now been published, is, to amuse us, to set us to disputing with one another, and thereby to draw our minds from contemplating our danger such as it really is, and, as the final purpose, to prevent us from providing against that danger by those new and great measures, which alone can afford us even a chance of deliverance. We shall see, accordingly, that the parliament, instead of immediately resorting to such measures; instead of restoring that independence in its members, which, when the crown was settled upon the present family, was declared to be essential to the security of the liberties of the subject; instead of cutting off the useless allowances which now make so considerable a portion of the burdens of the people, and which, together with the other enormous sums paid for purposes other than for the defence of the state, are daily diminishing the number of those who have any thing to lose by a conquest of the country; instead of seriously setting about such a system of retrenchment as would be at once an encouragement and an example to the people; instead of putting down that system of petty tyranny, of which Mr. Windham spoke in his address to the Freeholders of Norfolk, which system has grown up within these late years, and which is most vexatious and tormenting to the people; instead of doing away that mode of distributing the preferment in the church, by which several benefices are heaped upon one man, for rea-

sons too notorious to mention, and in consequence of which and of the neglect of duty therefrom arising, the people are, in all parts of the kingdom, leaving the established worship and flocking to conventicles, which are every where seen rising formidable rivals to the church, nay, which are seen crowded while the churches are nearly empty, and all this principally because the present mode of bestowing benefices and of dispensing with residence, have taken from the clergy, as such, that importance, which they would naturally have in their parishes, and the want of which they endeavour to supply by becoming magistrates and commissioners of taxes, thus resorting to the power of fear in place of that of love; instead of such measures as these; instead of a bold and resolute measure with respect to the army, by which the military force would be made to strengthen, in place of endangering civil liberty; instead of such measures as these, accompanied with a serious recommendation to every person of high rank so to act, in all respects, as to command the love and esteem of good men; instead of these measures and this recommendation, what shall we see? Disputes about the dispatches of Mr. Fox as compared with those of Lord Mulgrave; and about the management of the Third Coalition as compared to that of the Fourth Coalition. Debates, regularly fixed debates, day and hour named, about Mr. Windham's *Training bill*, as compared to Mr. Pitt's *Parish-bill*. We shall hear set speeches of two or three hours long; we shall hear joke against joke; we shall sometimes see the combatants foaming with rage at one another and giving loose to the most violent language and most bitter accusations, and we shall afterwards see them walking arm in arm together, laughing at what has passed; and this we shall be told is *gentleman-like*. Shall we see any man rising in his place and saying: "We call upon the people for unanimity, let us set them the example, and give them *proof* that we are unanimous in having for our first object, the preservation of the country. We call upon the people for sacrifices, and one of us, the moment after he was returned, expressed his willingness to share in any odium that might be incurred by imposing new burthens upon them, even to the taking away part, at least, of the necessities of life;" but, let us set the people an example in the way of making sacrifices; at any rate, let no member retain any thing that makes a part of those burthens. Shall we see any one instance of this sort?—The tendency of all the disputes and debates

that we shall hear, will be to prevent us from viewing the situation of the country in its true light; for, the general impression naturally proceeding from such disputes and debates must be, that the persons at the head of things do not seriously apprehend any danger; and the consequence of this impression must be not only to prevent any additional zeal in the people, but to make them less willing than they even now are to support the burthens of taxation. How different would be the effect, if it were at once declared from authority, that the evident intention of the enemy was not to cease from his labours, until he had conquered England; and, if this declaration were accompanied with an enunciation of the great measures necessary to enable England to carry on the war, without distress, for twenty years to come? We have talked much about *defence*; we have adopted many "measures of defence;" but, it has all along been a favourite mode of viewing the matter, to look upon the danger as temporary, and to conclude, that Napoleon would, when he had obtained such or such an object, rest contented, and leave us in the enjoyment of peace and riches. Mr. Windham, indeed, in the passage which I have taken for my motto, saw the enemy in a different light; but, there were only twenty-one members, whom Mr. Windham found to vote with him upon that occasion. The Addingtons, the Castlereaghs, the Pitts, and the Hawkesburies, saw nothing but golden and halcyon days approaching. Mr. Addington said, we might now husband our resources against another day of trial; Lord Castlereagh proved from the Custom-house and Excise-office books, that we had acquired more power than France had during the preceding war; Mr. Pitt (the famous wiseacre) asserted, that, by the overthrow of Tippoo Sultaun and by the legislative Union with Ireland, we had gained more power than our enemy had by all his extension of dominion and of influence; Lord Hawkesbury pledged himself, not to march to Paris indeed, but to shew, that, upon the breaking out of a new war, England would be more a match for France than upon the breaking out of any former war; and, they all said, that the giving up of colonies to Buonaparte was the very height of wisdom, because, being thereby gratified to the extent of his wishes, he would thereafter have no temptation to disturb the stream of our prosperity and happiness. This was one of the instances, one of the ten thousand instances of the shallowness of the mind of Pitt. So far from thinking that compliances with the wishes of an ambitious man, would

put a stop to the cravings of his ambition, ought not the contrary conclusion to have been drawn, and acted upon? And, besides this general reasoning, applicable to the case then before us, there were several particular reasons against the conclusion drawn by Pitt and his supporters. The passion of the people of France for military glory; the then yet existing hopes of the Bourbon family; the very nature of Buonaparte's power; and, above all, the certainty, which could not have escaped his councils, that, while England remained untouched, there was nothing completely finished. It was clear, that an authority, acquired by deeds merely military, resting entirely upon fame in arms, could not, amongst a people like the French, and with many branches of the House of Bourbon still in existence, long be maintained in peace, while there were yet remaining, in great power, several of those states who had twice leagued against the new order of things in France, and who only waited to recruit their strength, or, to use Mr. Addington's phrase, "to husband their resources against another day of trial." War, therefore, against some body or other, was absolutely necessary to the preservation of his authority; and, in the case of the German indemnities, as the arbitrary parcelling out of territory was called, it became evident that he had resolved upon the destruction of every state that might, even in time, have the power to annoy him. Such being, almost necessarily, his views with regard to the continent, was it not obvious, that the overthrow of England must form part of his design? No conquest that he could make upon the Continent was secure and permanent while England remained independent of his power. England remaining unsubdued, every other achievement was incomplete, because she always would have the power in the course of a few years, of finding the means, in almost any country that he could conquer, of stirring up a resistance to his authority; and, if once successful resistance began, history taught how rapid his reverses might be. The same reasoning applies to the present moment when, for instance, his conquest of Hol and cannot be regarded as secure while England remains independent. I say independent, because her maritime power and independence are inseparable. Nothing short, therefore, of the destruction of that independence; nothing short of the actual conquest and subjugation of England, can give solidity to his other conquests, not excepting that of the sovereign authority in France itself; it is the last labour; it is the binding knot.

and unless it be tied, all the rest may, at any time, unravel in a moment. Of this he and his new-created nobility, who are equally ambitious with himself, must be somewhat approaching to ideots not to be fully aware. That they are not ideots we know to our cost; and, taught as we have been by woe-ful experience, we must be worse than ideots, not to conclude, that the conquest of England is an enterprize as firmly resolved upon by them as the conquest of Naples was. —It is unjust to reproach them and to curse them, as the sons of 'Change Alley do, for having formed this resolution; because the right, the indisputable right, of making conquests, exists, at all times, in all nations, and in all cases, except forbidden by some positive compact, into which the conquering nation has previously entered. We may say, that the passion for making conquests produces misery and bloodshed; but, we may be answered, that all wars produce misery and bloodshed; and Napoleon may tell us, that, if his conquests were all completed, there would, as a matter of course, be an end of wars. In fact, arms are, after all, the reasons of nations; and, it is besides, very amusing to hear the nation, who has boasted of, and who has celebrated in all manner of ways, the conquests achieved by Cornwallis and Wellesley, railing against those who have projected the conquest of England. If, however, it should not be thought unjust to reproach and to curse Napoleon and his councillors, it is, at any rate, useless, and, therefore, childish. The Baalams of the city have cursed and cried alternately, any time these ten years, except during the short intervals when they were exulting in their triumph over the people in the elections of the Mainwaring and the Melishes; but, of what avail have been their cursing and their crying? The conqueror goes on; he comes nearer and nearer to their doors; and their curses and their cries he gives to the wind. It is the business, nay, it is the nature of nations to desire to conquer, as much as it is that of individuals to aim at the acquisition of property and of renown; if the former observe the laws of war, and the latter the laws of the land, their pursuits are equally justifiable; nor is there, that I ever heard of, any principle upon which a conquering nation can be condemned by other nations, any more than an enterprising individual can be condemned by other individuals; for, in both cases, the gain of one is the loss of others. It argues, the English disposition, to say the heinousness of a conqueror, or a ruler, who is

ing here, as in the case of individuals, ought to be that of rivalry; the more daring the plans and the enterprizes of your antagonist the greater ought to be your spirit of emulation. "Give me peace in my day," is, if applied generally, an absurd sentiment; if particularly a most base one. In the former it is absurd, because, ever since the world has existed, there have been wars; because wars are absolutely necessary to the existence of what are called nations; because if there were no wars there would be no rivalships, no separate interests, and without separate interests, how could communities of men be kept distinct, and what would become of the distinction of languages, and where should we look for that source of all those qualities and deeds that enoble mankind and that are the foundation of fame of every sort? If the sentiment be applied in a particular sense, then is it most detestably base; because it argues selfishness in its highest and worst degree; because it expresses a total disregard for the sufferings and disgrace of posterity; a total disregard for king, country, friends, brethren, and children, upon all of whom the wretch who says, "give me peace in my day," would entail misery and infamy without end, upon the sole condition, that he might be allowed quietly to eat and drink his way to the grave. —Yet, odious as this sentiment is, I greatly fear, that it prevails in England to a very considerable extent. Did it not so prevail, and had it not crept into those minds from which it ought ever to be most distant, it would be impossible that there should exist so little inclination as evidently does exist to make those sacrifices, and to adopt those measures, without which no man can point out to you a way in which he thinks the nation can be saved. The disguise of this sentiment, is, a pretended belief, that the danger is not so very imminent. "Why should I give up my place or my pension?" The case is not so desperate "yet." This is the language; and hence the affected opinion, that the conqueror will be pacified without subduing us. The same feeling, the same desire to live upon the labour of the people, and to domineer over them by the means of wealth so derived, will, I am afraid, induce men to sanction a surrender of our maritime rights and power, if ever it be brought to the point, whether those rights shall be surrendered, or whether we shall face the consequences of invasion. With the Continent, for the present, we have done. Every guinea now expended there will at once weaken us and strengthen our enemy. To preserve a decided superiority at sea is our only means of keeping



the war from our shores. This the enemy well knows; and, therefore it is, that he has constantly in view the cramping and crippling of our maritime force, which he would completely effect by obtaining a surrender of the *right of search*. In the effecting of this his darling object, I shall not, for my part, be at all surprized to see him joined by some of those who are now our friends; but, the minister who should dare to accede to the measure, would, whatever might be the fate of the country, certainly suffer the punishment due to the worst of treasons. Nevertheless, I am well satisfied, that no negotiator, who is not authorized to make some such surrender, will succeed in any discussions that may take place with the government of France.—As to the manner, and the circumstances of the negotiation, which has just terminated, there is nothing very striking in them; nothing, that I can perceive, worthy of very high encomium, and nothing at all calling for censure. Mr. Fox's dispatches are, from the first to the last, characterized by that simplicity and frankness, which always should, and which so seldom do, characterize writings of that kind. At the same time they are not deficient in point of either dignity or elegance. Lord Lauderdale has shewn himself, as every well-informed man expected he would, fully qualified for the task imposed upon him. His papers discover a mind stored with statesman-like knowledge, and the sentiments he has expressed, afford an ample refutation of all the base anticipations of the muck-worms and blood-suckers, who hated him only because they had good reason to regard him as the enemy of public-robbery, under whatever guise it might assume. To estimate the talents, as exhibited in these papers, on the part of England, the reader has only to compare them with the dispatches of Lords Hawkesbury and Whitworth; and were he not, by sad experience, convinced of the contrary, he would surely declare it to be impossible that the latter should have been the production of the same country as the former.—The length of these remarks does, I am aware, call for some apology; I cannot, however, refrain from adding a little to it, by a remark or two upon a pamphlet, which, within these ten days, has appeared, respecting the late negotiation. Not, indeed, upon the pamphlet itself, which contains nothing but a few loose and commonplace observations, and which but for one circumstance, I should be disposed to ascribe to the pen of Mr. BENTLEY, author of the "*NEAR OBSERVER*." It is the advertisement only of this pamphlet, that I think

worthy of notice. It begins by saying, that the war without end has now begun; it then tells us, in almost the words of Mr. Sheridan, over his wine and surrounded by his jolly companions, that we must prepare "for sacrificing even the necessities of life;" that we have excellent ministers, and that we must not embarrass them by representations as to the portion of our property that they take away; that we must repose an implicit confidence in them; and, that we must be content to have the constitution suspended; but that, *when the war is over*, all will come back to us again! I should have taken this for broad irony; but, alas! I have, within these six years, heard so much said, and seen so much done, upon principles, if they could be so called, nearly resembling these, that I am become very cautious of understanding such writers to be in jest. Time was, when a proposition to *suspend the constitution* would have exposed the proposer to the animadversions of the law, aided by the laudable vigilance of the government; and, we can all recollect, how perseveringly that candid and good-humoured gentleman, Mr. Sheridan, prosecuted Mr. Reeves for having given, in a speculating pamphlet, too great a share of authority to the king; but, now, thanks to that man, whose debts we have paid, and to whose fame we are to raise a monument; thanks to the slavish principles, which, for the preservation of his power, became sanctioned, no man need fear to say, to preach, to write, or to publish, any thing hostile to the rights and liberties of the people.—To return, for one moment to my subject; the chief object, which I had in view, was, to turn the attention of my readers from the mere diplomatic part of the late negotiation, from the confusion of ideas inseparable from the reading of the controversy as exhibited in the voluminous papers now before them, to the real situation of affairs between us and our enemy, to the ultimate views and determinations of that enemy with respect to England, to the means which we possess for frustrating those intentions, and to the feelings and the measures necessary for bringing those means into action. I fear I shall be thought a gloomy prophet; that I preach to unwilling hearers; but I fear still more, that my forebodings will prove true, and that my suggestions will never be listened to until it be too late.

AMERICAN STATES.—We have, from time to time, been informed, that there is a dispute existing between this country and the United States of America; and further, that Lords Holland and Auckland have, on

our part, been appointed commissioners for negotiating, with certain commissioners from America, an adjustment of that dispute. What the grounds of the dispute may be, we cannot as yet precisely say; but, from what has been thrown out in the *Morning Chronicle*, now the trumpet of the Treasury, there can be little doubt, that it relates to our measures for interrupting and preventing that contraband commerce, which the Americans have always been carrying on, to the great benefit of themselves and of our enemy, and to our very serious injury, and a right to carry on which commerce has always been contended for by Mr. Jefferson, the present President of the United States.—Seeing that such is the subject of discussion, I, for my part, cannot help feeling some degree of apprehension from the circumstance of the negotiation having continued so long. I cannot help fearing, especially when I take the half-official paragraphs of the *Morning Chronicle* into view, that we have gone, or shall go, too far in the way of concession; indeed to go one step in that road must and will be attended with mighty mischief; for, whatever is obtained from us by America must and will be obtained for France, and will pave the way for the accomplishment of the worst of her immediate views with respect to England. At no time, under no circumstances that the imagination can form to itself, would it be prudent, or safe for us to concede any point connected with the maintenance of our power at sea; but, at the present time, and under circumstances that I have endeavoured to describe in the foregoing article, concession would be the beginning of annihilation to the only force, on which we have now to rely for keeping the enemy from our doors. Give up the right of search, and to give up a part expressly will be giving up the whole by implication, or, at least by interpretation; give up that, and, in the space of two years, France will beat us in that which has hitherto been called the English Channel.—Refuse, and what is the consequence? The execution of a *non-importation act*, passed in America, suspended now, perhaps, but ready to be put in rigid execution the moment the final refusal is made known. And what will be the effect of this terrible act, which is to awe England into compliance? Into a surrender of rights, undisputed by the public law of Europe, and exercised by all nations, except those whose interest it has been not to exercise them, or who had not the power to exercise them? What will be the effect of this act, supposing the American govern-

ment to have passed it with any other view than that of exciting the fears of timid commercial avarice? The effect would be, if it were possible to execute the act, to prevent large quantities of goods from being carried to America from this kingdom, which, as the phrase usually is, would *greatly injure our commerce and manufactures*; for, as to our navigation, it would not injure that at all, it being very material to observe, that not one English ship would thereby be thrown out of employment, because not one English ship nor one English sailor (except, perhaps, some deserters from our colliers or our fleet) is ever employed in the transport of English goods to the American States. But, what is the meaning of this phrase, “injury to our commerce and manufactures?” It is certainly figurative. It would say, that by injuring our merchants and manufacturers, the measure would injure our country. But, those merchants and manufacturers must excuse me if I regard not this as a legitimate conclusion; for, numerous are the cases, real as well as supposed, in which a measure, which is injurious to particular classes of men, may be, and are, not only not injurious, but beneficial to the community in general; and, though this may not be a measure of that description, I am fully persuaded, that, if it could be strictly executed, the injury to the general interests of the nation, the injury to her power, to the means of defending herself, to the means of her maintaining her consequence amongst nations, would, if any at all, be very small indeed—I made, in my second letter to Mr. Windham, (see p. 867) when touching upon the consequences of the seizure at Hamburgh, some observations respecting the effect, in a national point of view, of excluding our manufactures from foreign countries, to which observations I beg leave to refer the reader, as applicable to this case; and, let me add here, that no abusive paragraph from a Treasury scribe, such as John Bowles or Redhead Yorke, will, either by me or my readers, be taken as conclusive proof, that those observations were erroneous.—But, would the injury, supposing it to be an injury, be all on one side? Would the Americans themselves experience no injury from this same measure? To hear some men talk upon this subject, one would imagine, that to get rid of goods, the produce of sheep's backs and of our mines and of the work of our hands was a positive good that nothing could counterbalance. If this be the case, why not throw them into the sea, instead of putting them on board of American ships, for the

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privilege of doing which we are to pay so dear? To hear some men talk upon this subject, one would really imagine, that it was purely to oblige us, out of mere compassion and Christian charity to us, that the Americans wore our cloth, and cut their meat with our knives. It may be the opinion of some, that they have proved themselves to be affectionate children; but, God preserve, I say, the parent from being reduced to a reliance upon their affection or compassion! God preserve the country I love from a dependence upon American generosity, charity, or even American justice! The fact is, that the Americans purchase our goods because they want them, and cannot do without them. Their whole dress, from the chin to the ankle, goes from England, Ireland, or Scotland. From the swaddling cloths of the baby to the shroud of the grandsire, all is supplied by us; and, it is in my power, at any time, to show, that, in return for English materials and English labour, England receives but, comparatively, a small portion of food or of raiment, the far greater part being a mere vehicle for enriching the few who profit from the trade. Can the Americans do without our goods? This is to ask: can they go naked; for, in the whole world, this kingdom excepted, there exist not the means of covering their backs; of keeping them from the inclemency of the weather, either by day or by night. To say nothing, therefore, of the numerous useful and necessary articles of hardware, and goods, indeed, of all descriptions, how are they to supply the place of English goods? "Other countries." What other country is there upon earth? Even before the French revolution commenced its havoc upon the manufactories of the continent, all the other countries in the world did not supply them with as much of the articles of indispensable necessity as Gloucestershire did; and, it will, I hope, not be forgotten by Lords Holland and Auckland, that, Napoleon, in his Northern conquests, must have broken up the small source of supply there afforded to America. But, "shall we not drive the Americans to manufacture for themselves?" This is a horrid possibility to be sure; but, we must first drive two other things amongst them, namely, *sheep*, and *downs* for the sheep to feed upon, and (I had like to have forgotten a third) a *sun* under which sheep can live and thrive. These are physical obstacles, which are not to be overcome, believe me, by a petulant act of Congress, though preceded by six weeks or two months of dull debate, in which, perhaps, fifty lawyers were exer-

cising their lungs for the bar, to the great annoyance of a hundred honest farmers, who had, at last, not a more correct notion of the consequences of the act, than Mr. Spankie (the Editor of the *Morning Chronicle*) now seems to have. It may seem incredible to some persons that there should be *no sheep* in America; and, there are many superficial observers, who will be inclined to dispute my opinions upon the fact of their having frequently eaten lamb and mutton there. But, it will be quite sufficient, in answer to all such, to state, that for *every man* in the United States, *five pounds sterling's* worth of woollens is annually imported from England. What, then, do they do with their own wool? The truth is, that they grow scarcely enough to answer the demand for stuffing saddles and such like uses; and they never can; both soil and climate being hostile to the breeding and the keeping of sheep. Supposing, therefore, that the people, almost all of them bred to agricultural pursuits, could, before their present stock of cloths is worn to rags, be collected together from their thinly scattered plantations, and moulded into manufacturers; supposing persons there ready to teach them the art of manufacturing; and supposing that unsupposable event, the transmutation of some of their lands into workshops, still the materials, whereon to work, are wanting; and, if ever they are obtained, from England, dear England, however they may hate her, and affect to despise her, those materials must come.—"But, our West Indian Islands. Cannot the Americans starve them?" I have answered this question in Volume VIII., page 660, and the following ones, to which answer I beg leave to refer the reader, where, I am convinced he will see reason to believe, that we have nothing to apprehend upon the subject of our West India Islands, the cutting off all connection with which would, as I have shewn in the article referred to, spread instant inconvenience and distress over any part of the United States.—Indeed, so far from the measures above spoken of being solely injurious to England, they would, in the end, be solely injurious to America; and, if I were an English minister, resolved upon breaking up of their Federal Government (a resolution which nothing short of determined and inveterate hostility on their part would lead me to form), I would ask no better means than the cutting off, upon justifiable cause, of all communication between this kingdom and those States. It may be asked, why this means was not

resorted to during the American rebellion; because we entertained the foolish notion, that the more goods we sold the better it was for us; and, if I am asked how the Americans were able to do without our goods then, my answer is, that they *did not* do without them; and that though there were the manufactories of France and of Holland to supply them, and French and Dutch fleets to protect the cargoes, four-fifths of the people must have perished had they not been supplied with English goods, of which their shops, in country as well as in the towns, were constantly full, notwithstanding prohibitions and seizures without end, and notwithstanding the goods, bulky as they were, were to be obtained, in the places not possessed by the English, by smuggling only. If such was the case in the time referred to, what must it be now? The war in Europe, though perilous to us here, has, in fact, if we manage wisely, disabled America from doing us harm, and has rendered the threats she now holds forth, dangerous to no one but herself. To us they might produce immediate inconvenience of small, comparative, magnitude; but, to the United States, or rather to the Federal Government, they would produce complete destruction. — But, says the *Morning Chronicle*, “do you find consolation in a measure because it will do harm to another as well as to yourself?” I have not the paper before me, and, therefore, I do not know that these are Mr. Spankie’s exact words, but the sense I have retained; and very much was I shocked at it; very much was I shocked to see a writer, under the immediate influence of the Treasury, have recourse to such a sophism, or rather untruth of statement, in order, as it appeared to me, to prepare the public mind for an abandonment of our most valuable rights. To hear Mr. Spankie one would imagine, that it was some new measure of *ours* that was about to be adopted, and that we were not engaged in a dispute for the maintenance of a right that has been exercised by England ever since England had a ship at sea. No, Mr. Spankie, if we voluntarily adopt a measure, especially of the sort we are now speaking of, injurious to ourselves, it is no consolation to us that it is also injurious to others; but, if it be that other who adopts the measure, or who forces it upon us, are we to find no consolation that his injustice towards us has produced mischief to himself? Are we to find no consolation “that the wicked hath tumbled into his own pit, and that the evil which he intended hath fallen upon his own pate?” Or,

are we, Mr. Spankie, to pray that he may prosper in his injustice? Are we to give up our right quietly, lest he should suffer from our resistance? Be consistent, then, Sir, and hold the same doctrine with regard to Napoleon. If he should land in England, I hope it would prove the destruction of both him and his host; and, would you, Mr. Spankie, not feel some consolation that it had so proved, though there is no doubt that the *measure*, as you would call it, would also be, in some way or other, injurious to ourselves. It is not, however, of a measure actually adopted that we are talking; it is of a measure which the opposite power (I will not yet say, *enemy*) threatens to adopt, unless we give up something to her: and, are we not, before we make the surrender, to inquire whether it be likely that she will, if we do not make it, put her threat into execution? And, in the making of this inquiry, are we to throw aside, as unworthy of our consideration, so material a circumstance as that of its being injurious to our opponent to adopt the threatened measure? For my part, I feel great satisfaction that it would be highly injurious to the American States; I rejoice that it would prove the cause of great misery and ruin amongst their inhabitants; I feel great consolation, that it would, in all human probability, cause the complete overthrow of their Federal Government, if that government, upon grounds so unjustifiable, were to act agreeably to their threats. — After all, however, the truth is, that the threat *cannot* be put in execution. The thing is impossible; and, when the reader has duly considered what has been said above, together with what he will find in page 660 of Volume VIII., he will, I am persuaded, be convinced, that our only danger, at present, with respect to America, is, that, from not well understanding all the matters connected with the subject, our negociators may be induced to go too far in the way of concession. I wish, as much as any man can, to see the two countries always upon good terms; I wish to see harmony constantly prevail between them; but, I think that man must be blind indeed, who does not perceive, that that object is not to be secured by concession. It is a very great error to suppose, that *all* the people of America approve of measures such as that which their government now threatens to put in execution; it is a very gross error to suppose, that they are foolish enough to hate England and to entertain an attachment for France, let her government or governors be what they may; and the truth is, that all

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considerate men in America are now condemning these measures of injustice, well knowing that the party, from whom they have proceeded, have in view some further acts that would prove very convenient to the private circumstances of many of them.—The party, to which I now allude, used, during the debates upon the treaty of 1794, to represent America as a *country gentleman*, and England as a *mechanic* that worked for him; “the former,” say they, “may do without the latter; but the latter cannot exist without the former.” And then, in the fullness of their arrogance (wherein they surpass all the world) they would tell you, that their exported goods were *necessaries of life*, while what they imported might be dispensed with. Just as if the shirt and the coat were not as much “*necessaries of life*” as bread or pork, particularly *American pork*? Their wheat and Indian corn are the produce of their land and their labour, and of unparalleled excellence they are. But, are not our woollen and iron and steel and tin and copper goods the produce of our land and our labour? And, if our labour were not employed in this way, would it not be employed in some other way, thereby adding to another sort of produce from our land? Where, then, is the sense of their comparison about the *country gentleman* and the *mechanic*? And whence can that comparison have sprung but from their own vanity, which had been puffed up by the encomiums of so many well-meaning but ill-informed men in Europe, particularly in England, added to the circumstance, that the persons, who made the comparison, had never in their lives had an opportunity of seeing any thing resembling, in the most distant degree, that sort of person, which we call a *country gentleman*, and which term, had they not borrowed it from us, could never have been in use in their country, except as descriptive of some character in a romance.—The fear is, that we shall go too far in the way of concession, which, I repeat it again and again, is not the way to live upon friendly terms with the United States of America; and, this is the opinion, too, of every man in America, who really wishes well to both countries. Why, indeed, should we talk of *opinions* upon the subject? Have we not the *proof*; ample proof; proof much more than sufficient, before us? From the close of the American rebellion to the present hour, there have been, at the beginning of every discussion, encroachments on their part, and, at the end of every discussion, concession on our part. The treaty of 1794 contained a stipulation, which, as the com-

pensation for concessions which we made, was to have brought about 3 millions of money in payments from America to us. *That* stipulation they refused to fulfil, while we honestly fulfilled all the stipulations weighing upon us; and, we finally accepted, by way of lumping compromise, the sum of 600 thousand pounds, while we paid them to the last farthing of their exorbitant demands, amounting, I believe, to about 3 millions! Has this infused moderation into them? No; and, what we should constantly bear in mind, while those who are privately interested in keeping well with America at the expence of any national sacrifices, are telling us of the importance of the *friendship* of the American States, that country, or its government, at least, has always the generosity to make these its attempts to encroach upon us, at those times when it sees us most closely pressed by our enemy in Europe, to whom they are, in this way, a most faithful ally; but to whom they would be perfectly useless, and will be perfectly useless, if our ministers have the wisdom and the firmness to set their faces against every demand for further concession.—That these ministers *will* so act, I am, however, so far from being certain, that I really fear the contrary; and, my fears are grounded, 1st, upon the half-official paragraph in the *Morning Chronicle*, before noticed, which appears, as I said above, to have been intended to prepare the minds of the public for some new concession to the American States: 2ndly, though I have not the most distant notion, that Lord Holland would, intentionally, do any thing wrong, yet, when the mind has contracted an habitual propensity towards peace, friendly intercourse, and conciliation, without being quite enough alive to the consequences, the chances are, that cunning men, may, under the garb of great frankness and kindness, lead it to the effecting of their purposes: 3rdly, I well know, that, though there are many merchants in England, who would sooner lose their trade for ever, than ask the ministers to do any act injurious to the general welfare of their country, yet, there are some merchants of another description; and, it is to be observed, that those who will prefer their own interests to that of their country will clamour, while those of the other description will, of course, have no pretext for making any application to the ministry: 4thly, I am still more afraid of another class of interested persons, and that is, of those who have had the precaution to lodge their money in *American funds*, or to rest it in *American lands*. Of the *patriotism* of such

men an estimate may easily be formed; and, if the liberty of the press, that "Palladium" of freemen," as every hired journalist calls it, while he is writing with a view of getting a portion of the taxes into his pocket; if this precious Palladium would permit me, I could, in a very few moments, and only by mentioning the names and situation of a few of these prudent fund and land-holders, convince the reader, that my apprehensions, in this respect, are founded on reasons but too solid: 5thly, I am afraid of the weight of another consideration connected with the 3rd, namely, that the ministers will dread, in a rupture with America, a diminution of the source of taxation. It will be erroneous to proceed upon the notion that such a diminution would take place; because, there is not the least probability, that the act of non-importation could be executed at all; because, if at all, and until the present stock of English goods in America be exhausted, it could not possibly be executed any longer; and because, whenever the channel was opened again, the English merchants and manufactures would find their profits, upon the whole, equal to what they would have been, if the channel had never been interrupted. But it is, nevertheless, to be feared, that the immediate wants of the ministers, the immediate pressure of the times, may induce them to concede now, with the hope, perhaps, of undoing their concession hereafter, upon the ground of its having been extorted from them. A vain hope, indeed! for the very effect of the concession will be to prevent them from ever undoing the deed; and, moreover, as long as the present system remains, the country would, by such concession (supposing it to extend to a relinquishment of any part of our right of search), be disabled for the resisting of further encroachment. This, one would think, they must plainly perceive; yet, if they should be persuaded, that a refusal to concede will produce a diminution in the source of the taxes, I am greatly afraid, that, acting here, as they have done every where else, upon the Pitt system of temporary expediency, they will concede.—Such are my fears. If the event shall prove them groundless, no one will more heartily rejoice than myself, and no one will be more ready to give praise unto those by whom the unjust demands of the American States may have been resisted; but, in case of the realizing of these my fears, I shall not be backward in saying all that I dare, under our present laws, to say, against every one, who may have participated in plucking this other, and almost the last, feather from the wings of my country.

Under any circumstances, however, under any laws, that do, or that may exist, I shall still have the power, and I am sure I shall have the will, to bestow on them my hatred, and to treasure up in my heart the hope of seeing the day, when the rest of my countrymen will think upon the subject as I do, and will have the power as well as the inclination to act accordingly. The man who makes any part of his happiness to consist in promoting the welfare of his country, should never give way to feelings of despair or of disgust; or, at any rate, he should never permit those feelings so far to prevail as to deprive him of hope, or to check the operations of his zeal. The man whose mind is fashioned for taking a share in those enterprises, no matter of what sort, that are connected with the fate of his country, will suffer no disappointments, no rebuffs, no acts of folly or of wickedness, whether in the rulers or the people, to turn him aside from his pursuits. Such a man, if, with all his exertions, he be unable to prevent evil from being done, instead of despairing will see new hope of good even from the excess of evil; and, applying these observations to the case before us, if, unhappily, our ministers, acting from the influence before described, were now to yield the most valuable of our rights to the American States, we ought still not to despair, but to labour with more assiduity than ever in the producing of a state of things, which would enable our country to recover those rights, and to hold them without the chance of their being again surrendered by such men and from such motives; we should labour with more eagerness and resolution than ever in the producing of a state of things, which would, for a long time, at least, prevent the possibility of the recurrence of such a surrender.—Here I should naturally stop, but there is a recent appointment more intimately connected with the subject than some persons will, at first, perceive, upon which I shall beg leave to add a remark or two. The reader will, at once, anticipate, that I allude to the appointment of Mr. ERSKINE to be our *Minister*, our *Ambassador*, at the court of the United States. This young man went to Philadelphia in or about the year 1798. What he went there for, at that time, the reader may probably know, or he may guess, at any rate. Suffice it to say, that, after remaining there some time, he married an American, who, I speak it to her commendation, is of what is called in that country, of a *Tory* family. This gentleman came home in 1800 or 1801. He began, I believe, to practise at the bar. Upon his father being made a Lord, he be-

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came one of England's senators, and one of the representatives of the borough of Portsmouth. He has since been appointed to the office above-mentioned; and the *Morning Chronicle*, in its newly-acquired courtly style, is "extremely happy to have to announce, that *His Excellency* the Honourable Mr. Erskine, his Lady, and his *suite*" (Good God! his *suite*!) "are safely arrived in the United States, and have met with most marked attention from His Excellency the President."—I have often thought it proper to offer some remarks upon our system with respect to the United States; and I have as often endeavoured to impress upon the minds of my readers the necessity of treating the American government and nation with respect full as great as that with which we treat the first powers upon the continent of Europe. I would, especially at a moment like the present, have sent a nobleman, and a man too, uniting some degree of diplomatic reputation with his title; such a man, for instance, as Lord Minto, who would have commanded from the weight of his character, as well as from the proof which his appointment would have given, of our respect for the American government and nation.—But, besides the want of weight in point of public character, there are, in my opinion, three objections to the appointment of Mr. Erskine: 1st, when he went to America before, not dreaming, doubtless, that the time would ever come when he should be Ambassador there, and nobody there dreaming it any more than he, he, from his age and from other circumstances connected with his then situation, naturally fell into the society of young lawyers and doctors and merchants; and, the reader is well aware, that long familiarity of this sort has a tendency contrary to that of producing ideas of great personal consequence. Supposing him, therefore, to be one of the wisest men upon earth, and I really *know* nothing positively against the supposition; and, supposing him to have learnt, in Lincoln's-Inn Fields, the whole art of diplomacy, he should, I humbly presume to believe, have been sent to some other court than that of America.—2ndly, It was, by many persons, in America, objected to Mr. Hammond, that he had married an American lady, especially as that lady also was of what they call a *Tory* family. Mr. Hammond, however, did not marry until after he arrived in the country. Nothing could be better calculated than this connection was to inspire private respect (and the same may, for aught I know, be said of the matrimonial connection of Mr.

Erskine); yet, I had opportunities of knowing, that, notwithstanding the perfect propriety of conduct and the distinguished talents of Mr. Hammond, that connection did operate, upon the minds of the people (and there the minds of the people are so politically important as to be worth conciliating), not advantageously to Mr. Hammond, and, of course, not advantageously to his country. This, as several persons in, and connected with the present ministry, can bear me witness is no *new* observation; and, when I made it before, it was, as my present observations are, intended to shew the importance of being very careful in selecting men to fill the station of minister to the American States. That Mrs. Erskine should feel a strong desire to see her country again is not at all surprizing. All women are patriots. I never saw the wife or daughter of an English emigrant, who did not wish to come home again, however successful the husband or father might have been. Women do not, like men, enter into political distinctions; and, therefore it is that, leaving all such distinctions aside, they are attached to their country more than men, as much as they are attached to their domestic homes more than men are. But, besides this general and most amiable propensity of the female mind, Mrs. Erskine had the additional inducement of appearing again amongst her countrywomen with the fair prospect of being, at no very distant day, a *peeress* of England. Nothing could be stronger; nothing that the husband could be more desirous to see gratified, especially when it is easy to conceive therein more than one source of gratification to himself. But, though I were disposed to applaud, in terms however high, these desires, I must still confess, that I could have wished to see them gratified, without the appointment in question, and without exposing my country to the chance of suffering from the envy and from the other feeling, which, in different minds, such gratification may possibly excite.—It was an invariable rule in French diplomacy, to prohibit a minister from marrying in any country where he was stationed, as also, not to send as minister to any country, a person married to a wife of such country; and, when the reader has duly considered all the possible, and even probable, cases, in which such connection may prove injurious to the transactions of an embassy, he will, I think, be inclined to agree in the objection, which I have now stated to the appointment of Mr. Erskine to the American States.—But, until it be proved to me, which, perhaps, would be no easy

task, that Mr. Erskine possesses either greater talents, or greater integrity, than Mr. LISTON, or any other of those gentlemen, who are now upon the two-thousand-pounds-a-year pension-list, as "late ministers at foreign courts," and who are able and perfectly willing to continue on actual service; I have a 3d additional objection to his appointment; for, not only might two thousand pounds a year be saved to the public during the continuance of the Embassy of Mr. Erskine; but, that sum, for each year of the remainder of *his life*, might be saved to us, seeing that, as the regular course now is to fix a pension to that amount upon every recalled minister, it will doubtless be fixed upon him, at his return, which, according to the present custom, will be in three years from the day of his appointment, and which is, in my way of estimating, a tolerably easy way of obtaining a life settlement, out of the national revenue, of two thousand pounds a year.—Such are my objections to the appointment of Mr. Erskine; and, if the Whigs urge, as they doubtless will, that the same sort of things were frequently done during the administration of Mr. Pitt; during the twenty years' administration of that man, whom they represented, and justly represented, as the ruiner of his country, and to make us pay the debts of, and to raise a monument to the fame of whom, they have since most cordially agreed with his former supporters; if these Whigs; if this patriotic and modest set of men, urge, in this instance, the example of Mr. Pitt, all that I have to say, in reply, is, that I believe, from the bottom of my soul, that they will rigidly follow all his examples, as long as there is one six-pence of means remaining within their reach.

PARTIES—At the very sound of this word upon our ears, after all that we have witnessed within these ten months, there arises a feeling of disgust so powerful as to demand no small share of fortitude and of public spirit to bear up against it, and to enable one to proceed in the useful work of detection and exposure. But, we must not only keep up our spirit; we must also preserve our temper. It is foolish to rail at the torrent; to yield to it is base.—That the Huskissons and the Roses and the Cannings and but I forget the rest of them; that they should endeavour to persuade us, that they are a *party*, is quite natural; but, that the Morning Chronicle should have taken such pains to establish the same fact, is, to common observers, truly wonderful. It is, however, perfectly notorious, that this paper, the mere slave of the offices,

has, ever since the change of ministry took place, worked day and night, in order to convince us, that there was "AN OPPOSITION." The public thought, that opposition, long so called, was at an end, at least, for a time; but, every day of our lives, were we told of the Opposition; the Opposition said this, in one paragraph; the Opposition did that, in another paragraph; and then "His Majesty's ministers" said so and so to the Opposition; and the Opposition did so and so "to embarrass his Majesty's confidential servants;" inasmuch, that, before the end of the session, the persons above-named really began to think themselves at the head of an important political party.—Some persons have professed themselves to be at a loss to discover the motive of the Morning Chronicle for raising the Huskissons and Cannings into an Opposition; and some of them have been rash enough to conclude, that the editors (Messrs. Perry and Spankey) did not know what they were about. But, when a couple of news-writers have formed a settled resolution to write themselves into a comfortable maintenance out of the public money, that is to say, out of the taxes, that man must be rash indeed, who will hazard the assertion, that they know not what they are about! In such a case, they are handed like Briarius, they are eyed like Argus, they have the watchfulness of Jupiter himself. They lose not a nod or a wink, not a frown or a smile, of their patrons, whose every wish and thought they anticipate. Not know what they are about! Would to God that their patrons knew as well what they were about for the good of the country, as Messrs. Perry and Spankey know what they are about for the good of themselves!—The truth is, that, as long as this Pitt system lasts, there must be an Opposition. There is no doing without. It is a thousand times more necessary than the tub to the whale. In short, were there no Opposition, the game would be up, in a short time, with the speechifiers of the major class as completely as it, for some time past, has been with John Bowles and Red-head Yorke and the rest of the small fry, who existed solely upon anti-jacobinism, and who are now in a situation resembling that of the buckle makers after shoe-strings came in fashion; and, for my part, I have heard of things much more astonishing than would be a petition to parliament from them for an act to make it libellous to say, that there are no jacobins in the country. All manner of tricks have they tried to keep their trade going. The Middlesex election, in 1804, gave a little revival to it; but, it soon fell off

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again. It was too abominable to set up a cry against jacobinism, in England, at the very moment when Buonaparté was setting up the same cry in France. Now, indeed, Bowles and Redhead, if one may judge from their recent language, seem to think the Emperor and King a good sort of a man; and, I hope I am not uncharitable in my surmises, but I really could not help remarking, that the language of the most famous anti-jacobins, that their asperity against Buonaparté, began to soften after it had appeared in the newspapers, that *he had left the placemen and pensioners at Berlin in quiet possession of their allowances, of which he had ordered regular payment to be continued!* He is a cunning fellow. And, remember that I say, that, whenever he is going to make war upon us in earnest, he will take care to cause it to be understood, that he means to pursue the same liberal line of conduct here also. — To return to “the Opposition,” since the Morning Chronicle will insist upon having one; what head is there in the country, that has any brains in it, that expects any good, any public advantage, from such an Opposition? Can those men, who have nothing to talk about but the great financial talents of the author of the Income Tax; of the enlightened mind of the man, who began and conducted that series of negotiations and of wars, which has carried Napoleon to the confines of Russia; of the great and unparalleled integrity and purity of that man, who, being first Lord of the Treasury and first Minister of the Crown, lent forty thousand pounds of the public money to two members of the House of Commons, without interest, without making any record of the transaction, and without communicating any knowledge of it to his colleagues? Can such men, I ask, be expected to oppose any foolish or any wicked act of the present ministers? — No: let us not be amused with such a silly expectation; let us not waste our time in reading, or in talking about, their *speeches* on either side; let us, while they are assembled together, watch their *actions*; let us read and remark upon the acts they pass; let us look well to what they do with the public money; and, when any valuable information leaks out, let us note it down; in short, let us well observe all they do, and let us judge for ourselves. — This is, I am aware, most heretical doctrine; and, I dare say the orthodox politicians would make a bonfire for me as cheerfully as the orthodox catholics formerly made the bonfires in Smithfield. This doctrine of mine strikes at the very root of the system, by which they thrive, and which never could

have existed, had there not always been an Opposition; a good, steady, legitimate, fair-fighting Opposition; that is to say, an Opposition, having in view to oust their opponents, and to get into the enjoyment of all that those opponents enjoyed. An Opposition, though consisting but of twenty men, who should have resolved to have lived upon bread-and-cheese and small beer all their lives, would have put an end to the system long and long ago, and would have caused the affairs of the nation to be conducted in such a way as would have made her present situation, in every respect, the reverse of what it is. — As to the subjects, upon which “the Opposition” intend to figure, the *Finances* are, I should suppose one. The Morning Chronicle has already told its readers, that it is “uncommonly happy to have” to announce to them, that our financial “affairs are in a most flourishing state.” The same will be announced, doubtless, from other, though I have too much manners to say *better* authority, before these my speculations reach the press. “Well,” will say the Opposition; “and did not we tell you so? Did we not tell you, that that great man, that ever-to-be lamented statesman, Mr. Pitt, had left you upon a bed of roses; and that you had nothing to do but to follow the measures he had begun?” This the COUNTER, which is “the Opposition” paper (there being evidently a perfect understanding between that and the Morning Chronicle), has, in fact, already told them; and, though it is outrageously insulting to the feelings of the nation, yet, with regard to the place-hunting, the turncoat, Whigs, it is no more than just. They have done no good. They have made no alteration in the system. They have performed no one of the things that they stood pledged to perform. They are now supporting the Pitt system, without any even the least softening. They have adopted it. They have made it their own. And they will justly be made responsible, I hope, *really responsible*, for all the consequences of it. — Another subject, upon which “the Opposition” will figure, will be the Army and Volunteer bills, and there they will be backed by all the fools in the country, a countless host! Here will the sprightly Canning crack his jokes one moment, and weep and sob, the next moment, at the mention of the name of his dear departed Right Honourable friend, the author of the Parish Bill and of the loan to Boyd and Benfield, without interest, while he was paying them interest for their loans to us. — This army subject will be endless. There will be six or seven set days for it.

They will *divide* upon it! It will be all in vain. Never; no never, will the people of England be again amused as they have been, thanks to the Whigs, who, if they have done no other good, have, at least, done this, to strip all party haranguers of the power of deceiving the people.—During every debate that will now take place, the Whigs will cut a most contemptible figure. To throw any blame upon the former principles and conduct of the present Opposition, they dare not; because, that would be to throw blame upon the principles and measures of Mr. Pitt, to do which would expose them to the displeasure of the Grenvilles. If they should be goaded into any thing of that sort, George Rose will exclaim, "Oh, my dear lamented Right Honourable friend!" And the petulant Whig will be reproved in a manner that will prevent a repetition of his offence. Not one of Pitt's measures; not one of the measures, which he adopted, or caused to be adopted, previously to his last coming into power, will any one of the Whigs ever dare to mention with disapprobation; and, really, those were measures, which, with the exception of what related to Lord Melville, were subjects of laughter, rather than of serious animadversion. It was his measures relative to Ireland; relative to India; relative to the regency; relative to the distribution of office, of tithes, of emoluments; relative to the increase of taxes, to the abridging of the people's liberties; relative to his wasteful and foolish wars, and his still more foolish negotiations. These are the measures, for having been the promoters and supporters and instruments of which the Whigs might accuse "the Opposition;" but, they dare not; for, even if they could make us forget that they have taxed us to pay Mr. Pitt's debts, they will not themselves forget, that, even since Lord Grenville came into power with them, he has called Mr. Pitt the greatest and wisest and most upright minister that the world ever saw! This has served as a hint for them; and, never, since that day, have they dared to reproach the Huskissons and the Longs of having been the supporters of the measures of Mr. Pitt.—Mr. Whitbread did, at one of Mr. Sheridan's dinners, give a sort of pledge, that the proceedings against Lord Wellesley should *suffer nothing* from Mr. Paul's not being returned to parliament. Now, whether this was intended as a counter hint to Lord Grenville, or merely as an electioneering promise, I shall not pretend to say; but, I am pretty certain, that it will never be fulfilled. If it should, however, be attempted, we shall then see how little power the

Whigs have left. "The Opposition" would join with the Grenvilles and the Addingtons; and, I verily believe, that the whole Whig party would be found to consist of less than *ten* men that would *vote* upon the occasion. This party is, therefore, extinguished, for which, at any rate, I am grateful; for, since they came into power, they have, some actively and some passively, proved themselves to be utterly destitute of principle. This party is gone. The others are not parties. There is no difference between them as to any one *professed* principle even. It is now, without any attempt at disguise, a mere wrangling for place and emolument; and as such, thank God, it is, at last, seen by a great majority of the people.

THE NEW PARLIAMENT.—Little good, as to measures, as most people are inclined to hope for, from the dissolution of the parliament, I am one of those who approved of the dissolution, without troubling myself at all about the motive from which the ministers acted in resolving upon the step. It is, to be sure, ridiculous enough to hear their partizans justify it upon the ground, that "the last was a *peace* parliament, and that "now, Prussia having determined to enter "heartily into the war, a *war-parliament* "was wanted to give effect to the plans of "His Majesty's Ministers." According to this notion, a new parliament should be called for upon every new measure; and, it should be, at once, openly avowed, that the parliament is a mere instrument in the hands of the ministry of the day. But, the good part of the thing now, is, that this parliament, which, according to these writers, were called to give effect to the plans of His Majesty's ministers upon the continent, have met just in time to be officially informed that those plans are all completely frustrated, and that Lord Morpeth, who was sent out to back and encourage the King of Prussia, on the part of England, has returned without having been able to find him. So that this *war-parliament* will, in all human probability, have to act the part of a *peace-parliament*! —Absurd, however, as all this may be, I thank the ministers for dissolving the last parliament; and, if they were to dissolve this new one to-morrow, I would thank them for that too. As to the last parliament, the parliament who passed the Pitt indemnity bill and Pitt debt and Pitt monument bill, it was absolutely impossible that any honest man should regret its decease. But, the reason for which I like a dissolution of parliament, is, that, be the motive what it may, from which it takes place, it is sure to make a little *stir*; it is sure to keep alive cer-

tain useful recollections. It does, some persons tell us, do no good, while, on the other hand, it renews in our shocked sight scenes which it is not necessary for me to describe in detail, a traffick, which, for the sake of the liberty of the press, may as well be nameless here, though the reader will find it most circumstantially described in the former speeches of Mr. Grey, now Lord Howick. But, this is a good of itself. We should forget these scenes and this traffick, if we were not reminded of them by a dissolution, now and then; and, to forget them would be very injurious to us; because it would cut off the hope of any amendment; and this the Old Whigs (who were just like the new ones) clearly saw, when, with Excise Walpole at their head, they changed the duration of parliaments from three years to seven. I shall be told, perhaps, by some factious persons, some of the enemies of "His Majesty's confidential servants," that, it was not with a view of keeping alive, in the minds of the people, a sense of their political rights, that they advised their Royal Master to dissolve his "faithful Commons;" to which my answer, is, that I am not bound to believe that His Majesty's confidential servants are necessarily the very wisest of the human race, and that, so long as the action tends to what I regard as public good, I shall not, in such a case as this, cavil at the motive.—Besides the general effect of reviving useful recollections, every dissolution does, and will until things are gone much farther than they have at present reached, give rise to some one or more important contest; as, for instance, in the present case, the contests in *Hampshire*, *Middlesex*, and *Westminster*. In the former, indeed, most of the contending parties were, perhaps, as to great political principles, nearly upon a level; yet, though the contest was, as far as they were concerned, confined to very narrow views, and had little more in it than a struggle for power and emolument, or private gratification of one sort or another; and though MR. CHUTE, while the really independent part of his voters were doing him the honour to unite his name with that of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, had the folly (folly of which he will hear again) to ride post up to Brentford to vote himself against that same Sir Francis Burdett, yet, the election did good amongst the people of Hampshire. On both sides, the candidates appealed, in words, at least, to the independence of the freeholders; they professed on both sides, to be struggling for the independence of the county; on the one side, they made a merit (and justly) of having served long in parliament, without obtaining places or pensions,

and, on the other side, one of the candidates actually resigned a place in order thereby to remove one objection against him. All this was paying a great compliment to public principle and to public opinion; it was assuming a virtue, if they had it not; and, though it may prove in the end, that the people were deceived by all these professions of love for independence, yet they, or at least many of them, *thought* they were voting in that cause, and their minds have been prepared for future, and, let us hope, more successful exertions.—Those who see in an election no other object than merely that of seating a member in the House of Commons, will, of course, see no good that has been done by the dissolution, in giving rise to the contests in *Middlesex* and *Westminster*. But, will such persons, however they may dispute the good, pretend to believe, that the sixteen speeches of Sir Francis Burdett, promulgated, as they have been, through every public print in the whole kingdom, together with his several addresses, particularly the last; will they pretend, that all these have produced no effect? Will they pretend, that the silly, time-serving, apostatizing letter of the famous Whig, Mr. Whitbread, together with all the answers which it has drawn forth, from various pens, have had no effect? Will they pretend, that all the speeches, all the addresses, all the resolutions, all the numerous publications relative to the Westminster election have had no effect upon the people? Can any man, who saw Westminster at the time; who knows any thing of Westminster; who has had an opportunity of hearing the sentiments of her well-informed electors; and who considers the force which, in due time, their excellent example must have upon the rest of the kingdom; can any such man say, that the Westminster contest has produced no effect? Look, who will, at the elder Sheridan now, and compare what he now is to what he was previous to the Westminster election; look also at Mr. Whitbread, and make, with respect to him, a similar comparison; look at the polling of Mr. Byng, and compare it with the great majority that he always heretofore had in *Middlesex*; look at the whole of those Whigs, who so long deluded the people with the sound of patriotism and disinterestedness; look at them (for they dare not look at you) and then say, whether the elections in *Middlesex* and *Westminster* have had no effect!—A dissolution of parliament is always, and always must be, a positive good; because it is sure to give rise to much discussion upon the principles and the conduct, private as well as public, of men aiming at posts of

high trust. At the same time that it creates the subject of discussion, it enlarges for a few days at least, the freedom of discussion; and, as free discussion must necessarily tend to the establishment and the extension of truth, it must, by all those who prefer truth to falsehood, and knowledge to ignorance, be regarded as a good. The hired daily press, that press, which, in one way or another, is almost completely suborned to utter nothing but falsehood; even those prints that put one in mind of Addison's fabled stars that shed darkness instead of light; even the blinding and stupifying effect of this nebulous constellation is dispelled by the flashes of an election contest like that of Middlesex or Westminster. Therefore, I once more heartily thank the ministers for having dissolved the last parliament, and the sooner they dissolve the present, the sooner will they again merit and receive my thanks.

MESSRS. WHITBREAD AND REDHEAD YORKE.—These persons have, it would appear, both *challenged* Sir Francis Burdett to fight duels. The letter of the former has appeared in the Register; that of the latter has been stated in substance by himself, Sir Francis Burdett not having thought proper to take any public notice of it. The letter of the former does not, indeed, amount to a challenge of itself; but, it clearly indicates, that unless "satisfaction," as it is called, was given, a challenge was to be the consequence.—Before I offer any remarks upon the particular cases of these worthies, I shall beg leave to trouble the reader with a few words upon the subject of duelling in general in this country, laying aside the legal and moral considerations therewith connected, and confining myself, for the present, at least, to a view of it; first, as *a test of courage*, and next as *a mode of deciding disputes*.—As a test of courage, I should be inclined to award it some degree of merit; because the proof, and, perhaps, the only certain proof, of courage, is, a readiness voluntarily to hazard life; and, this is the most admired, and most admirable, quality amongst men, because, of all earthly possessions, life is that which all men naturally value the most. But, there must here be some discrimination; for, to make the hazarding of life a test of meritorious courage, the motive for hazarding it must not be that of the highwayman, or of the felon breaking out of jail; *nor must it proceed from that sort of despair, which is visible, when a blasted reputation renders the chance of death preferable to a life of shame and ignominy*. I shall, for the argument's sake, however, suppose that challenges always proceed from motives in

themselves laudable; and then, what is the practice, and how does it come up to our ideas of a test of courage? Is one of the parties *sure to fall*? Is there, except in very few cases, any hazard at all of losing life? Are not the parties, nineteen times out of twenty, perfectly "*satisfied*," with what, in the cant of the science, is called, *exchanging shots*? Do they not, more than nine-tenths of them, go to the place of meeting with their limbs trembling and their hearts palpitating, like those of lambs led to the slaughter? When one has let off with blinking eyes, like Gil Blas in the troop of robbers, and the other has shot his pistol in the air, do they not rush into each other's arms like long-lost lovers? Are they not, after this, from feelings of mutual gratitude, sworn brothers to the end of their lives, extolling each other's courage to the skies amongst whomsoever are silly enough to listen to them? Do we not see amongst duellists, and amongst the patrons of duelling, cowards the most notorious; men, who, when in the face of an enemy, from whom they had *real* danger to apprehend, have *uniformly turned their backs*, and brought, as far as in them lay, *dishonour upon the arms of their country*? And, shall we, with these truths before us, call such men brave? Shall a farce so despicable impose upon us, even to the making us regard those who have run away from the enemy as patterns of heroism?—

Want of room prevents my pursuing the subject any farther at present. The continuation of these remarks, with the application of them to the particular cases of the worthy Messrs. Whitbread and Redhead Yorke shall appear in my next.—The same cause obliges me to defer the promised observations I intended to make upon the conduct of THE SHERIDANS at the Play Actor's Dinner, where the elder Sheridan affected to treat all that I could say, "*with ineffable contempt*," pretending to think that no one would believe what I said. He knows better. He may disguise his feelings from some people, but he cannot from me. No hare, with half a mile of naked downs before her, and with a brace of my Lord Rivers's best greyhounds at her heels, ever cocked her ear with more anxious solicitude than he will, on Saturday next, to hear the contents of this Register. I speak this, not to his shame, but in his commendation, it being the act of an enemy to represent him as so callous as not to feel what I have said, and what I shall say, of him.

WM. COBBETT.

Bertram House, }
19th Dec. 1806. }